Introduction
In preparation for the privatization of Karachi Electricity Supply Company (KESC), a stateowned vertically-integrated electricity utility in Pakistan, the company requested that the regulatory body (National Electric Power Regulatory Authority -NEPRA) grant a multi-year tariff (MYT). Prior to this submission the Government of Pakistan (GoP) had requested NEPRA to consider the possibility of granting a MYT (March 2001) . 2 The new regulatory framework was proposed to assure the prospective investor that it will be allowed a reasonable period to recover the losses of the initial years of privatization before the base tariff is adjusted through a reviewso permitting a much smaller initial price increase than would have been necessary if an MYT framework were not established.
The MYT established by NEPRA in September 2002 is essentially a CPI-X price cap on the controllable costs of KESC while uncontrollable costs are considered on a pass-through basis. The assurance to earn reasonable returns and incentives to make investment are based on the investor meeting the efficiency targets, especially those relating to losses, set by NEPRA. The adoption of MYT for KESC is a radical shift from a rate of return (ROR) regime to performance based regulation in the power sector of Pakistan. Similar MYT schemes are expected to be introduced for other distribution companies in the country. This paper briefly reviews the most salient features of the MYT that has been established. As the first clear MYT in the energy sector in South Asia there are clearly lessons in this determination that other regulators and regulated companies should consider. Some issues for consideration have also been noted.
Background on KESC
Before considering the specifics of the MYT it is useful to consider the power sector in Pakistan and the characteristics of the company which had requested the determination.
The generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply of electricity in Pakistan is presently undertaken by two vertically-integrated public sector utilities, with significant contribution to 1 Ian Alexander is a Senior Economist and Joseph Wright is a Young Professional in the World Bank's South Asia Energy and Infrastructure Unit. Aftab Raza is the Senior Economist at the Regulation and Supervision Bureau for the Water and Electricity Sector of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and should not be attributed to their employers. Comments were received from participants at a SAFIR workshop on multi-year tariffs in South Asia, held August 2003 as well as Chris Shugart, Clive Harris and Bernard Tenenbaum. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 2 The economic advantage of incentive or performance based regulation as compared to a cost of service or rate of return regulation have been acknowledged in many countries, including the UK, USA, Australia and Abu Dhabi (UAE).
generation from various private thermal Independent Power Producers (IPPs).
3 These utilities are KESC and the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). WAPDA supplies power to all of Pakistan, except the metropolitan city of Karachi and some of its surrounding areas which are supplied by KESC. Electricity in Pakistan is produced in various thermal (oil and gas -4,590MW, coal -150MW), hydroelectric (5,009MW) and nuclear power plants (325MW), however the generation in KESC system is predominantly from thermal oil and gas power plants. 4 The government has embarked upon a plan to restructure and deregulate the power sector by corporatizing and privatizing the state owned electricity utilities. The power wing of WAPDA is in the final stages of being unbundled into a number of generation, transmission and distribution companies, with a number of these companies earmarked for privatization in the near future. In contrast to WAPDA, KESC is planned to be divested as a vertically integrated utility. NEPRA has been established as the independent regulatory body for the electricity sector in Pakistan through an act passed in 1997. 5 KESC is a vertically integrated electricity supply company undertaking all elements of the supply chain -generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply. 6 It provides services to a customer base of 1.7 million predominantly urban customers in an area of about 6,000 square kilometers in the Sindh and Baluchistan regions of Pakistan. The total population in its licensed area is estimated at well over 10 million. Initially established as a private company in 1913, the GoP took majority control in 1952 while leaving the company listed on Pakistan's three stock markets (Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore). Presently, the government ownership in KESC is about 98% 7 . In 1999 there were about 12,500 employees of KESC.
While KESC owns and operates four power stations (total installed capacity of 1,756 MW) it also purchases power from a range of other sources. 8 These include: • Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), the main electricity utility for the rest of Pakistan; • State-owned companies, Pakistan Steel and Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP); and • directly from two Independent Power Producers (IPPs).
The load characteristics for KESC are provided in the following table. Figure 1) . The experiments with public sector management through nontraditional methods including the induction of army personnel in uniform as top managers since 1999 have not shown any signs of significant improvement. It is recognized that even substantial tariff increases may not increase revenues of KESC due to possibility of customer shift to selfgeneration and increase in pilferage. Privatization is therefore considered by many a better or rather the only way out. 1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 2012
Actual Future Targets
Information on the financial position of KESC is provided in Annex 1 while the losses issue is discussed in more detail later in this paper.
Part of the preparation for privatization of KESC has also been a financial restructuring aimed at clearing the accumulated losses of the business and making the forward looking situation more acceptable. Consequently, during 2002 the GoP: 9
• converted Rs 83.176 billion of debt into equity; and • wrote-off Rs 57.202 billion of capital to eliminate accumulated losses.
KESC is planned to be divested as a vertically integrated utility through the sale of 51 to 74 percent of total equity with management control to a strategic buyer. Various target dates for privatization have been set and lapsed without success at least since 1997. Most recently, preliminary information to investors was issued in March 2002.
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These actions were supported by a loan and technical assistance from the Asian Development Bank.
Expected privatization has raised the question about the certainty regarding tariff that the privatized KESC can charge its customers. The regulation of KESC to date has been on adhoc basis and driven by the compulsion to compensate KESC for its losses and inefficiencies.
Regulation of KESC to date
NEPRA was established in January 1995 under an ordinance and was formally notified in January 1998 after the passing of the act in 1997. It finalized its Tariff Standards and Procedure Rules in December 1998. NEPRA's Tariff Rules allow formula based tariff designed to be in place for more than one year. However, the regulation of KESC and WAPDA has been on ad hoc basis, at least until the determination on MYT.
KESC filed its first petition in July 1999 for tariff decrease by 1.61% which was approved by NEPRA in August 1999. KESC's second petition was submitted in August 2000 by the Ministry of Water and Power on behalf of KESC. This was for an automatic fuel adjustment formula to compensate KESC for changes in fuel price for KESC's own generation or external sources of generation, in the form of adjustment to the average sale rate. The adoption of automatic fuel adjustment formula was a significant step towards the formula based MYT.
KESC's tariff was not precisely based on ROR regulation. In recent years, the actual cash outflows mostly exceeded the estimates because of higher actual losses as compared to targets and increased debt service liabilities. Consequently, NEPRA accepted that, the inability of KESC management to achieve the stipulated target of losses created the compulsion to resort to tariff increases or increased financial support from the government (in the form of subsidy or equity).
NEPRA's Determination on MYT Scheme
In May 2002, KESC filed a petition before NEPRA seeking an increase of 16% in the average customer tariff and approval of a formula based MYT for the next ten years. The tariff was proposed to be reviewed after a period of ten years and thereafter every five years. On September 10 th 2002 NEPRA finalized the determination on the KESC submission and duly sent this to the Cabinet Secretary as per NEPRA's law (GoP has 15 days in which to assess the proposal and request any reviews). In its determination, NEPRA approved the MYT framework for KESC while making a number of changes to the proposal. The framework is described below (presented graphically in Figure 2 ):
1.
The base tariff for MYT shall be the prevailing average customer tariff with an initial increase of 6.5%. Table 2 shows various components of the base tariff: 
2.
For the period up to the end of sevens years after privatization, the average sale rate shall be subject to the following adjustments:
• Quarterly adjustment for variation in fuel component of KESC's own generation costs (Go) due to fuel price variations during the previous quarter.
• Quarterly adjustment for variation during the previous quarter in power purchase cost (Po) in accordance with the power purchase agreements with external sources (e.g., for inflation, exchange rate variation, fuel price variation, etc.).
• Yearly adjustment to O&M components of Go, To and Do by applying the Pakistan consumer price index (CPI) based inflation rate for the previous year less an efficiency factor X. Table 3 shows the factor X for various O&M costs. 3. To avoid significant tariff fluctuations from one quarter to another, a number of measures shall apply to quarterly tariff adjustments. Particularly, the quarterly tariff adjustment for fuel cost variation shall be limited upto a maximum of 2.5% and for power purchase cost variation upto 1.5% (a quarterly limit of 4% in total). These limits shall apply separately such that the respective remaining burden or relief is transferred separately to the next quarter.
4.
A claw back mechanism (CBM) shall apply whereby the profits accruing to KESC beyond a pre-determined real ROR on asset (before tax and interest) in a certain year is shared with consumers through tariff reduction in the next year. The consumers' share increases as the profits increase beyond certain levels of ROR. Profits translating into ROR in excess of 12% shall be shared in the ratio of 25:75 between consumers and KESC respectively, in excess of 15% in the ratio of 50:50, and in excess of 18% in the ratio of 75:25.
Assessment of New Regulatory Framework
According to NEPRA, the purpose of an MYT for KESC is to:
• assure the incoming investor that the profits through reduction in technical losses, pilferage and other efficiency measures over a certain period will be sufficient to compensate for the financial losses expected in the initial years.
• better serve the general public interest through economic efficiency, least cost service and improved service quality.
• bring more predictability in consumer tariffs by restricting the tariff adjustments to known indicators such as fuel price and inflation indices.
MYT has certain obvious strong advantages, such as certainty for investors and customers, compared to the traditional ROR regulation. Since the approved MYT is based on CPI-X price cap, it also provides strong incentives for KESC to reduce losses and costs to earn and retain profitsalthough these are blunted to some extent by the CBM. While the principles are simple, the devil is in the details of how the framework is designed. The follow ing sections briefly review the most salient features of the MYT that has been proposed, such as:
• Certainty and predictability of tariff for investors and customers.
• Form of control and its associated incentives and risks.
• The determination of the allowed rate of return.
• Targets for loss reductions. • O&M efficiency targets.
• Process for pass-through of certain uncontrollable costs.
• Timescale allowed for review of petition.
As the first clear MYT in the energy sector in South Asia there are clearly lessons in this determination that other regulators and regulated companies should consider.
Certainty and Predictability of Tariff
It is often argued that privatization and regulatory strategies must work together. Regulatory uncertainty is usually considered as the major obstacle to successful privatization. Potential investors have the perception that the tariff-setting methodologies used by the regulatory agencies in Pakistan and other countries of the region lack certainty, as they fail to clearly define the price-path for the future that can assure the investor of recovery, and earning a return on, its investment. However, the concern that has been mostly raised is the uncertainty about the tariffs. The owner of a distribution company recently privatized (which then went into problems) in Orissa (India) considered MYT as imperative for resolving deep-rooted problems with the government and regulator. The World Bank has identified risky and weak regulatory frameworks for infrastructure (including electricity) in Pakistan as one of the four key reasons for government's failure to improve the investment climate in the country.
The regulatory uncertainty is the inability of investors to predict with confidence what tariffs they will be allowed to charge after privatization. Investors' concern is not the levels of tariffs but their certainty. This is because the levels of tariffs, if certain, can be incorporated by the investors in the bid at the time of privatization. The value that investor bid for the asset is simply the present value of the estimated net cash flows from the asset. Tariff being the source of revenue is the main input to this asset valuation exercise.
The investor may not be much concerned with losses that the company is presently suffering as it indicates the potential of improvement and hence profits that the investor can make. However, this is to the extent that such losses are not beyond company's or investor's control.
In fact, the regulatory certainty was the main reason for the government's proposal as well as regulator's decision to adopt MYT for KESC. NEPRA forecasted that with MYT and KESC meeting its targets for system losses, KESC or investor should be able to reduce its cumulative losses to zero during the next three years (2003 -2005) and to earn a reasonable accumulative overall return over seven years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . This is shown in Figure 3 , along with historical trends. The MYT will not only provide the certainty for the investors in KESC but also to its customers. Customers also appreciate certainty about the price path since it allows them to plan future expenditure. Having prices that move significantly from year to year, let alone quarter to quarter, may make some budgeting decisions difficult for both industry and households. Providing certainty to customers through MYT price-path helps overcome this difficulty.
An uncertainty which remains with the regulation of KESC is the absence of any clear-cut commitment from NEPRA about the continuity of MYT framework at future price review. That is, whether the incentive based MYT will continue after seven years from privatization, though with new base tariff and X factors at the next review. In any case, the investor is likely to seek the required commitment from the government at the time of privatization, possibly backed by sovereign guarantees or some form of regulatory guarantee from a multi-lateral organization.
10

Form of control
In determining an MYT, the first question which the regulator needs to assess is what form should the proposed MYT take? There are four key characteristics that need to be considered:
• Scope of the control.
• Type of the main control -price-cap, revenue-cap or hybrid?
• Risks associated with the allowed rate of return • Period of the control.
Scope of the control
As discussed in the background section of this paper, KESC undertakes all aspects of the electricity supply chain, as well as purchasing power from private and separately state-owned generators. Since the main reforms in Pakistan have been aimed at unbundling the electricity supply company, KESC will be subject to separate licences and each of the licensed businesses is separately regulated.
So, there are four separate forms of control, as detailed in the following table. The relative importance of each aspect is discussed later in this paper. O&M is subject to CPI-X incentives, other costs passed-through Purchased power
Entirely a cost pass-through Transmission All costs subject to price cap regulation, O&M is subject to CPI-X incentives Distribution
All costs subject to price cap regulation, O&M is subject to CPI-X incentives
Type of cap
Once the scope of controls for various elements is set, the regulator then needs to answer that, for the three elements that are subject to incentive regulation, what form does this control take?
Three options are available -price-caps, revenue-caps and hybrids (combinations of the two).
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In each case, NEPRA decided that a price-cap was appropriate as a way of maximizing incentives for the operator to:
• increase sales;
• improve the quality of service and over time slow and even reverse the move to owngeneration; • reduce technical and non-technical losses; and • reduce controllable costs.
Although the latter issue is also addressed through the direct determination of revenue, creating positive incentives was felt to be appropriate. NEPRA also stated that the creation of maximum incentives for KESC was appropriate owing to the starting point of having costs greater than 10 Reference Farida/Joe's paper on distribution regulatory guarantees.
The differences between these approaches and the implications for incentives and gaming are described in Ale xander and Shugart. revenues and NEPRA's desire to ensure a fair initial price increase.
12 Further, as discussed in the following section, mechanisms were also approved to share any significant up-side benefits from the incentives with the customers through a CBM.
Rate of Return Risks
One by-product of price-caps is the possibility of earning significant levels of profit if the number of units sold increases rapidly (possibly due to unforeseen growth, faster than expected reductions in losses or gaming by the company at the time of setting the control). Some of these factors are under the control of the company, others not. Accordingly, to share some of the potential benefits from faster sales growth (and other actions that increase profitability) a sliding scale system is also proposed.
What is suggested and approved is an asymmetric sliding scale -the upside is shared but not the downside. It is also the case that different levels of sharing are suggested, so that incentives for the company are tapered. The proposed system is set out in table 5 below. The base level of real return on assets, 12%, was determined through a consideration of some market data:
• the real rate of return in Pakistan is about 8% at the moment; and • a risk premium for the sector of 4% is felt to be appropriate.
No attempt to measure the required rate of return through models such as CAPM etc was presented in the tariff determination. However, some evidence was presented at a later point and this is evaluated in the following section.
What does the sliding scale system imply for profitability? Figure 4 illustrates. There are also implications for the overall return earned by the company owing to the interaction of the sliding scale system and the revenue-smoothing system adopted. This is discussed in detail in Annex 2. Of course, the MYT for KESC does not guarantee an ROR, however it assures KESC an ROR over a long term if it manages its costs efficiently as envisaged. The expected RORs of 12%, 15% and 18% are used only to assess the reasonability of the review period and limits of profit sharing in CBM.
While there seems to be no strong possibility that KESC will earn any profit in the early years of MYT and any significant profits even in the later years, the CBM should be regarded as a good attempt to further reduce such possibility in view of the quality of cost data provided by KESC and to avoid any political or public relations damage to the regulatory framework in case the investor makes windfall profits. However, the design of CBM has two inherited flaws: • The mechanism is subject to manipulation. KESC can increase its regulatory asset base (and thus reduce actual ROR) by adjusting the sequencing, by bringing forward, investment thought prudent at times when the threshold ROR is expected to be exceeded.
• The profit sharing is subject to discrete levels of RORs. That is, the same profit sharing percentages apply to a wide range. For example, the sharing ratio 25:75 applies to returns in the entire range of 12-15%. Ideally, the scheme should have been continuous or should have many small ranges, so that the customers' share of profits would have increased more rapidly with increase in return than what is allowed under the present design.
While the latter point would help overcome some of the perverse incentive for manipulation of the CBM system, it of course also increases the complexity of the system. As such, any regulator needs to trade -off the complexity, with associated costs, and the incentives created for gaming the system.
Period of control
KESC in its submission to NEPRA requested a 10-year price control period. NEPRA, in its assessment of the proposed length of the control took the following issues into account:
• most international evidence on the length of price controls is between 3 and 5 years; and • KESC, unless significant initial price increases are allowed would remain loss-making for several years.
Owing to the latter point, NEPRA chose a pragmatic approach, trying to weigh up future profits against the initial losses, while being aware of GoP's plans for privatization. Given the 12% allowed real rate of return, it was found that a zero or positive NPV was possible after 7 years. So, a 7 year price control period has been approved by NEPRA. NEPRA's determination, however, does not contain the actual analysis or calculations leading to the seven-year conclusion. This may raise the issue of transparency of the regulatory process and make it difficult for interested parties to replicate such calculations and convince themselves of the justification of seven-year duration.
Clearly, choosing a price control period that is long by international standards has some implications. These include:
• the potential for significant cost shocks to occur;
• the potential for unanticipated demand growth etc. to lead to significant abnormal profits; and • unanticipated shocks impacting on investment requirements that could have a signficiant impact on the company.
The design of the regulatory system should help control for some of this. For example:
• the profit-sharing system should protect against abnormal profits becoming an issue; and • the cost pass-through elements for uncontrollable costs should protect against unanticipated shocks. However, it is not clear that the investment issue will be sufficiently captured through the system that is proposed. This could prove to be an important point. For example, KESC's generation plants and networks require massive investments. However, the base tariff does not incorporate any investment plan nor does the MYT framework provides any explicit assurance for recovery of any investment (for example, there is no discussion of how an asset base will be calculated and updated). In other countries where CPI-X (or even ROR) regulation is in vogue, the utility is provided with an allowance for its prudent investment and any investment plan underlying such allowance is carefully monitored.
NEPRA has argued that the approved MYT provides an incentive for investment in capacity expansion by allowing KESC to increase its revenue through increase in consumer base and increase in sales/consumer without any restriction. Investment in system refurbishment will reduce losses and consequently generation costs and hence will be rewarded as increased profits. If the reduction in losses exceeds the efficiency targets, the company will earn more profits. With a larger asset base (which would avoid triggering of CBM), KESC will be able to retain most of the resulting profits.
However, it is not obvious that the benefits of investment (increased sales and profits through capacity expansion and reduction in losses and generation costs) would be enough to recover the actual investment with reasonable returns. As far as the profit sharing through CBM is concerned, as noted above, it may incentivize the company to manipulate its ROR to avoid or reduce any profit sharing with the customer, rather than to provide direct incentives for investment. It could be argued that the investor will take into account its investment requirements while submitting its bid at the time of privatization rather than to make investment in response to any indirect incentive of MYT.
A further issue that should be considered when thinking about the period of the control is the linkage with privatization that NEPRA has created. While NEPRA had approved the MYT for a period of seven years commencing from the date when KESC is privatized, it had to come into effect prior to the privatization that was expected to be completed in calendar year 2002. Although such application may be desirable for certainty, better efficiency incentives and a successful transition phase, it must be recognized that the continuing public ownership may ultimately place a limit on the efficiency improvements that can be achieved.
A key issue relevant to the duration is raised, "What will happen if privatization is delayed considerably?" If KESC is not privatized, say, for 2 to 3 years, the MYT period will run for about 9 to 10 years which may have some undesirable outcomes. In particular, a state owned KESC will be subject to the MYT principally designed for a privatized KESC and to performance targets that have not been achieved so far. KESC may therefore ask for revision of approved MYT or for additional tariff increases if the privatization is delayed significantly.
Efforts are underway again to progress the privatization. This could yield a result later this calendar year, or early the next. As such, NEPRA has continued with the application of the MYT even though it does have the option of switching to a more prescriptive approach -set out in the original determination. While this is laudable as per the points set out above, there does have to be some concern about applying an incentivized approach to a company whose corporate governance is such that if does not necessarily respond to standard corporate goals.
With hindsight, NEPRA could have set a target date for privatization of KESC, say two years and then have had two separate MYTs: one MYT for up to two years when KESC is not privatized and another MYT for five years after privatization. The former MYT would have been revised if KESC is not privatized in two years based on the circumstances and latest information. This approach would have capped the total duration to seven years and addressed other concerns. Presently, the total duration of the approved MYT could be interpreted as open-ended, although that does not seem to be the approach being adopted by NEPRA.
Determination of the allowed rate of return 13
As noted earlier, the 12% allowed rate of return was recently explained in a presentation by one of the members of NEPRA. It was built up accordingly: The issues discussed in this note are covered in more detail in ******, Ian Alexander (forthcoming).
Cost of equity
Cost of Capital Weighted average cost of capital (WACC): [(a) x (d)] + [(b) x (c)] = 12.2%
Undertaking a full assessment of the applicability of this number is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some initial observations can be made.
Methodology
Within the standard WACC approach adopted by NEPRA, three methodological issues can be raised:
• mixing forward looking and backward looking approaches;
• clarity about what is being measured; and • need to make adjustments to the beta value.
The approach that NEPRA have adopted for the cost of equity is the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This is a forward looking approach to estimating the cost of equity and is employed by many regulators in developed and developing countries. However, the approach adopted for the cost of debt is a backward looking assessment of the rates at which the company has been able to borrow money -this is a more traditional approach to the cost of debt, especially when the cost pass-through of interest is allowed. However, the backward looking cost of debt approach is inconsistent with the cost of equity approach when combined like this in the WACC. Forward looking costs of debt are likely to be significantly lower than those at which the company has borrowed in the past since there has been a significant shift downwards in the riskfree rate.
While there may be some circumstances in which it is appropriate to view interest payments as a cost pass-through item, it would be more appropriate to keep this as a separate item and to focus on a cost of equity approach. Further work on the cost of debt would seem appropriate.
Linked to the above issue is the one of exactly what is being estimated. There are many different bases on which WACC can be calculated. These depend on the view as to whether it is the position of the company being considered or that of the investor and whether returns are measured pre-or post-tax. 14 The determination of exactly what is being measured is important since it impacts on how other elements of the cost-flow are being incorporated into the revenue requirement. For example, if post-tax figures are being employed then tax payments need to be included as a separate cash-flow item -that is not necessary if a pre-tax figure is being utilized. Clarity about this will allow the consistency of the revenue requirement calculation to be determined.
In relation to the equity beta -the measure of the relative riskiness of the business -there are two adjustments that should have been considered. These relate to:
• the form of regime employed; and • the capital and tax structures of the company relative to the comparator.
Equity betas are a reflection of two factors:
• the underlying business risk, referred to as the asset beta; and • the capital structure of the company.
14 Chp 7 of Alexander (forthcoming) discusses issues relating to taxation and the alternative ways of viewing the available approaches.
Business risk is, itself, a function of several factors. One of these is the type of regulatory regime -different types of regime leave the operator more or less exposed to general economic conditions. As such, when using comparative date to establish an estimate of the business risk it is important to ensure that either companies facing similar regime types are used, or that an allowance is made for the regime type. In the case of KESC, US data was employed to establish the business risk. No single type of regime is used in the US, rather different states used different approaches ranging from traditional rate of return regulation to earnings-sharing (profit-sharing) and price-caps. 15 As such, clarity about the exact comparator used and whether the regime was comparable to that being proposed for Karachi is necessary to establish whether the right comparator was being used.
Secondly, as noted above, the capital structure of a company also has an impact on the equity beta value. So, an asset beta is the better starting point since this can then be adjusted to the capital structure proposed for the company being regulated rather than just using the capital structure of the comparator. Again, clarity about the comparators utilized would help determine if the approach was appropriate.
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Estimates
While much of the methodology employed is standard across regulators, the estimates employed need further analysis. For example, the market risk premium is an estimate of the additional average annual return required to hold a basket of all assets rather than just the risk-free asset. Traditional values for this in developed countries have focused on a range of between 6% to 9% while more recent evidence has suggested values between 3% and 4% might be more appropriate.
17 So, the proposal by NEPRA to employ a value of 3% would suggest that either a relatively aggressive estimate has been taken, or there is a strong belief that the international capital markets are efficient. It may be that a higher figure could be appropriate -the state of the Pakistan market would need to be evaluated.
Further, the use of a country risk premium is a good way of correcting for the fact that primarily US data is being employed. However, a 2% premium would seem to be low. Evidence on comparable borrowing rates for countries with different ratings is provided in a range of journals including the Financial Times. While data is not specifically provided for Pakistan, it is possible to consider premia paid by comparable countries. This evidence would bolster the justification for the numbers used.
Comparable estimates for other infrastructure providers
A final source of information which can help establish the appropriateness of a regulatory estimate is the rates allowed for other companies. One example here is the fact that OGRA, the gas regulator, allows the gas transmission and distribution companies to earn between 17% and 17.5%. The basis for these figures is less clear, but the fact that these figures are significantly higher than those allowed by NEPRA should signal that further analysis of this issue is required.
15
Reference to Brian Williamson's paper on US regulation.
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There are also arguments about needing to adjust for taxation when de-leveraging an equity beta value. This is explored in some detail in ***** (reference the Australian papers on this).
17
Reference some recent article on this -maybe the OXERA paper by Tim.
Overall, NEPRA has taken a major step forward by setting out the calculations that it employed when deriving the 12% allowed return figure. While there are some issues about the methodology and the estimates involved, these are issues that can be refined.
Losses
While an incentive based system has been established for the O&M costs of the various elements of the company, the possibility of additional profits arising from out-performing these incentives is limited.
Like the rest of South Asia, the largest 'controllable' cost that the company faces is related to losses -outside the scope of the O&M incentive scheme but captured/incentivised within the price caps for different elements -if KESC can reduce its losses, it will earn additional profits to the extent allowed by the claw back mechanism. Figure 1 illustrates the evidence on losses for KESC since the mid-1980s. Although some periods of slight improvement have been seen, most recently in 2001, the overall trend has been for the situation to become worse.
NEPRA in the determination make two specific comments about losses:
• losses for FY03 should be 35% and FY04 30%; and • that within a 10-year period the operator should be able to reduce losses to 15%. This was supplemented by some further information in the financial projections suggesting that:
• auxiliary consumption (the own use of power by the generating plant) would drop from 6.1% to 5.8% over three years; and • the forecast of T&D losses for FY05 was 26.5%, suggesting a further 3.5% point improvement from FY04.
Since no specific details are given about how this longer term decline should be phased, the figure assumes a constant rate of improvement to reach the 15% from the FY05 figure.
How possible is a 10% improvement in 2 years? It is clear that concerted effort, as seen occasionally since the mid-1990s can lead to improvements in excess of 2-3%. But these improvements have never been sustainable.
It is also not clear as to where the majority of the losses lie, are they technical or commercial? Owing to the poor financial position of KESC over the past few years there has been a significant reduction in the investment programme. Consequently it is not possible to determine whether the rapid deterioration in the losses is due to technical issues, linked to the reduction in investment, or the more general commercial problems raised by law and order issues.
What is clear is that there is a general commercial losses issue in Pakistan and, if previous experience is anything to go by, a significant element of the KESC losses will be commercial. As such, it ought to be possible for reductions to be made in a timely manner, although it will also be important to ensure that these savings are then cemented rather than being lost in a matter of years.
18 18 KESC is also likely to come under further pressure from WAPDA to ensure that the losses are constrained. KESC has been a major source of receivables for WAPDA and given the increasingly tight budget constraints imposed by GoP there will be pressure to ensure that this is not the case in the future!
Efficiency
When thinking about the main aspects of efficiency, apart from the losses question addressed above, there are three things worth considering:
• How important are the O&M costs?
• What efficiency factors are proposed and how were they determined?
• What is the planned evolution of real O&M costs?
Importance of O&M costs
The cost structure of the existing electricity system and the relative importance of O&M costs was set out in table 2. As can be seen from the table, although O&M costs account for only about 10% of the total cost of delivered electricity, they account for over 60% of the distribution costs
Efficiency factors
KESC accepted the need for efficiency factors and made the following proposal. They also suggested that a 0 X factor be adopted for the first three years of the price control. NEPRA were not minded to link the X factor to the inflation rate, believing that the factors determining X were independent of the inflation rate. Rather, they considered:
• the potential impact of too aggressive X factors on quality of service;
• the need to ensure that the X factor captured industry efficiency rather than company specific; • the fact that T&D losses are the most significant efficiency/cost factor; and • incentives for investment to promote capacity expansion should be ensured.
Given these factors, the X factors set out in table 3 have been proposed for the O&M costs of the different elements of the industry. For years four to seven they provide an overall target of about 2.7% of controllable costs. Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the controllable costs over the lifetime of the control.
As shown in figure 5 , NEPRA has set efficiency factors (X) at zero for the first three years and then 2-3 % for subsequent years. While the zero efficiency factor for an early period of MYT is adopted in other countries, 2-3% X-factors for subsequent years are on the lower end of the X factors adopted by other regulators -this also does not take into account the significant cut in base tariff made by regulators at every 4 to 5 years. For example, the UK electricity regulator's second price controls for distribution companies stipulated one-off price cuts in the range of 11 -17 % and an X factor for 2%. The next price controls resulted in more significant price cuts (18 -35%) with an X factor of 3%. In Victoria (Australia), the regulator set X factors in the second price controls for distribution costs in the range of 12% and 22% in 2001 and thereafter 1% each year from 2002 to 2005.
Figure 5: The evolution of O&M costs over the life of the proposed price control
Further, the UK experience shows that the actual efficiency improvements made by companies have been well above those assumed by the regulators in setting price controls. Table 7 shows the annual real unit operating cost reductions in the UK electricity utilities since privatization. The average annual reduction is about 6.5 -6.8%. 19 These improvements are calculated after taking account of the effect on costs of changes in output levels and the level of service quality, and so can be taken to represent "underlying" efficiency improvements. The efficiency improvements actually made by the utilities are more relevant than the efficiency improvements assumed, as the former indicate the extent of efficiency improvements that can actually be realized. among other things, on the environment a utility operates. However, it may be argued that KESC's present situation indicates a greater extent of efficiency improvements that can be achieved compared to the UK utilities. Although it is worth noting that the X factors for KESC are in addition to the system loss reduction targets set by the regulator.
In general, the establishment of a non-zero x factor for KESC should be considered as a good step in the right direction. CPI-X price caps can successfully work for state owned utilities, however it is recognized the continuing public ownership of an entity may ultimately place a limit on the efficiency improvements that can be achieved.
Evolution
Given these X factors and the relative costs of each segment of the industry, it is possible to determine what the evolution of O&M costs over the life of the pric e control. This is shown in Figure 5 above. If the total costs of electricity supply in Karachi are considered, the X factors amount to an effective 0.15% annual efficiency target (or a 1.5% of O&M costs annual efficiency target) over the life of the price control.
Cost-pass through
As mentioned when discussing the form of the price control, the vast bulk of costs are treated on a cost pass-through basis. This section considers four elements of the pass-through:
• the Fuel price adjustment formula;
• the PPA adjustment formula;
• the process by which the adjustments are made; and • the cap to the maximum allowed change in any one quarter.
Fuel price adjustment
For own generation, the largest uncontrollable cost is for fuel. A fuel cost pass-through system had been instigated in 2000/2001 for the Pakistan electricity sector but this has not been successful (primarily owing to process issues described below). In the KESC determination a new version of the adjustment mechanism is proposed which also separates power purchase adjustments from pure fuel cost changes.
For the fuel cost pass-through, consider the following example.
Consider 5 quarters: Q 0,1 (actual), Q 0,2 , Q 0,3 , Q 0,4 , Q 1,1
A change in fuel costs during Q 0,1
Then: estimate the impact over the actual quarter (Q 0,1 ) and the next 3 quarters (Q 0,2 to Q 0,4 ) Assessment of costs is based on actual price for current quarter and this new price as the forecast for the next 3 quarters (done in paise per kWh). Then, using the actual generation and forecast generation, determine what the revenue impact is.
Revenue is then recovered as a paise per kWh adjustment over the next 4 quarters (Q 0,2 to Q 1,1 ), so smoothing the impact by:
• allowing for seasonal variations in production/use of fuel; and
• not having to recover the current quarters higher costs immediately but spreading it over the following four quarters.
So, this approach dampens volatility but could become extremely messy if frequent fuel cost changes occur.
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Power purchase
Power purchase costs from IPPs are basically treated the same way as fuel costs (a consideration of the change for the current quarter being assessed over the next three quarters and then recovered over the next year) but it is all costs rather than just fuel costs.
Process
As noted above, one of the issues with the fuel cost pass-through over the past year or two has been the process by which it is applied. The Government had requested NEPRA to find an automatic system for allowing quarterly changes in fuel costs. NEPRA contends that the 1997 act does not allow for automatic changes in tariffs, any change must be notified to the Government and placed in the official Gazette.
However, for smooth and immediate application of the above mechanisms, NEPRA decided that KESC shall make request on a prescribed form, rather than in the form of a full-fledged petition, for the required adjustment to the average sale rate and consequently significantly reduced the time required by NEPRA to make its determination.
In an attempt to clarify how they believe this system should work, NEPRA has stated the following:
• the company is allowed to request an automatic change each quarter, with the dates for the quarters clearly set; • within 4 days of receipt of the request, KESC will be allowed to implement the change (subject to having to refund any difference if so determined); and • as quickly as possible, and no later than 1 month after receiving the request, NEPRA will finalize the determination and submit to the Government.
In view of the apprehension that KESC may not be prompt to request an adjustment in case of expected decrease in tariff (which would be unfair to customers), NEPRA decided that if case KESC does not submit a request for tariff adjustment in a relevant period NEPRA shall take a suo moto action on the basis of information available to quarterly or yearly adjustments on account of fuel price, power purchase and profit for claw back.
Cap to quarterly changes
Under the existing fuel cost pass-through system, a maximum quarterly change of 3% is allowed. KESC proposed that this be changed to 5%.
NEPRA reviewed the issues and determined that the following maximum 4% cap (with carryover of any under recovery -but no interest cost allowance) be established using:
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This system is also a refinement of the system used for WAPDA. This is examined in more detail in Annex 3.
• a cap of 2.5% of the final retail tariff for the fuel cost adjustment; and • a cap of 1.5% of the final retail tariff for the power purchase adjustment.
It is also proposed that any failure to meet losses targets should not benefit from the cost passthrough protection. So, investigation to consider losses and additional sales will be required to ensure that the protection is not provided.
However, the investor needs to assess the risks associated with the limits the regulator put on the quarterly adjustments to the tariff. The furnace oil and gas prices have increased by about 15% and 8% per annum respectively on average over last 5 to 6 years. Over a longer term (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , such average annual increases are about 18% and 12% respectively. Assuming that the fuel price variation would be in the range of 8-18% p.a. over the control period (which translates into quarterly variation of 2 to 4 %), the quarterly adjustment to the fuel component of Go which makes about 50% of average sale rate will result in about 1-2% increase in average sale rate and hence being below than the limit 2.5% will be allowed.
However, if the fuel price increase is significantly high (like the 70% p.a. increase in 1996-97), the investor will not be able to pass on full fuel cost increases for sometime. Any cost of borrowing or working capital to support increases needs to be assessed careful as the MYT framework for KESC does not allow any interest to be applied on late recovery of fuel costs (and power purchase costs) from the customers. Equally important is the issue of customer affordability. The success of MYT depends on whether customer will be able to afford frequent and significant tariff rises, and whether the political government will let such a framework work as envisaged. Some of the automatic fuel cost adjustments over the last year have not been as timely as expected, partly owing to government concerns about the implications of such increases.
In the rare case, a maximum of 4% quarterly tariff adjustment for fuel and power purchase costs (which translates into 17% annual tariff increase) and 0.3-1.3% annual tariff adjustment for CPI-X indexation (based on actual inflation of 2.7-13% p.a. during the last ten years) may be required. This translates into an overall annual increase in tariff by 17.3-18.3%, the affordability of such increases has to be questioned -whether borne directly by consumers or indirectly through taxation if the Government chooses to subsidize the tariff.
Privatization
Finally, NEPRA made some comments about privatization. In principle the MYT is only enacted once privatization has occurred since the whole rationale is related to providing certainty and incentives for a private operator. If this fails to materialize, some additional directions are provided by NEPRA relating to issues such as the size of receivables, rehabilitation of KESC's own generation facilities, etc. KESC would then be able to file further tariff petitions as it had done previously. However, as noted above, the system is effectively being utilized and a price increase as per the MYT was processed during the summer of 2003.
While it is not explicitly stated, NEPRA is basically following the view that it is not possible to create incentives for State Owned Enterprises. In the vast majority of cases this would appear to be an appropriate assumption. See Irwin and Yamamoto for a discussion of the circumstances within which incentives may work for a State Owned Enterprise.
Implementation processes and timescales
NEPRA's Tariff Rules provides for formula based tariff designed to be in place for more than one year. These rules set out the standards and criteria to be followed while NEPRA examines and decides on a tariff petition. The rules also clearly lay down the procedure for dealing with a petition from the date of filing of the petition till the final determination of NEPRA and decisions on any review motions or reconsideration request by the government. NEPRA has to decide on tariff petition within six months of the filing of a petition. In practice, more time is required for a comprehensive review of tariff if it is to be in place for a long time such as 5 to 7 years. Regulators in other countries where MYT is in vogue conducts thorough consultation over 18 to 24 months and publishes a number of consultation papers before they arrive at any decision. NEPRA needs to assess this aspect of its procedure and ensures more transparency and objective consultation with interested parties.
Summary
NEPRA's determination of a MYT for KESC reflects the first serious attempt in South Asia to create a comprehensive MYT system for an electricity company. 22 There are many positive aspects to this which other regulators in the region and internationally can learn from. These include:
• the reasoning for the length of the control period and certainty, incentives and risks for prospective investor; • the building of elements of a regime to control for shocks, abnormal profit concerns etc.; and • the process solutions for automated quarterly adjustments.
There are, however, some areas that require further investigation. These include, but are not limited to:
• the treatment of, and incentives for, investment -no explicit rules for the regulatory asset base, inclusion of investment, treatment at the end of the period etc are provided; • whether the 12% real rate of return is sufficient;
• lack of details in the determination on various aspects eg rate of return, appropriateness of duration; and • inadequate time (six months) allowed by NEPRA Tariff Rules for determination on such a long-term MYT -international regulatory practice on CPI-X price review suggests 1-2 years.
While the la tter point need not be an issue if the sale price is allowed to be below the nominal value of the equity, it would be an issue for future reviews. Price Figure A3 -3 shows the different in prices that occur between the two approaches. As expected, the WAPDA approach leads to initially higher prices in all cases but, of course, also has periods where prices would be lower. So, if protecting consumers from price volatility is a concern, the KESC approach would seem to be preferable.
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Impact of additional constraints
As noted earlier, these approaches have an additional constraint -there is a limit to the price change allowed in any one quarter. Now, provided that the ceiling is fixed irrespective of the approach, it will always be the case that the "WAPDA" approach will have a greater probability of hitting the ceiling since it is a more volatile system.
Should this matter? In principle no, provided that any costs borne by the company owing to the imposition of the ceiling are recovered in an NPV neutral way. However, the approach in Pakistan is to allow the recovery of the nominal amount rather than the real amount and, as such, the imposition of a ceiling could lead to losses for the company. 
